Do rating grades convey important information: German evidence?

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. In this paper we investigate the impact of credit rating changes on German stock market. We evaluate daily abnormal stock returns of companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (HDAX). Rating upgrades and downgrades are made by three rating agencies: Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch Ratings. We find that rating announcements are largely anticipated, i.e. German market adjusts stock prices long before the rating changes have been made. Additionally, we report that the market, along with anticipating the rating change, reacts stronger to downgrades compared to upgrades

Measuring competition using the Boone relative profit difference indicator

This paper suggests a method for implementing the theoretical relative profit difference test for intensity of competition due to Boone (2008). An empirical illustration is given for banking systems in emerging economies

Disentangling the European airlines efficiency puzzle: a network data envelopment analysis approach

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. In recent years the European airline industry has undergone critical restructuring. It has evolved from a highly regulated market predominantly operated by national airlines to a dynamic, liberalized industry where airline firms compete freely on prices, routes, and frequencies. Although several studies have analyzed performance issues for European airlines using a variety of efficiency measurement methods, virtually none of them has considered two-stage alternatives - not only in this particular European context but in the airline industry in general. We extend the aims of previous contributions by considering a network Data Envelopment Analysis (network DEA) approach which comprises two sub-technologies that can share part of the inputs. Results show that, in general, most of the inefficiencies are generated in the first stage of the analysis. However, when considering different types of carriers several differences emerge - most of the low-cost carriers' inefficiencies are confined to the first stage. Results also show a dynamic component, since performance differed across types of airlines during the decade 2000-2010

Political connections, bailout in financial markets and firm value

The paper shows that politically motivated interventions in the financial market in the form of bailing out borrowing firms reduce banks’ incentives to gather valuable information about firms’ projects. This loss of information is a hidden cost which adversely affects firm value. Firms invest resources and pay a premium to politically connected persons (BOD or other personnel). Such connections serve the twin purposes of hedging and enhancement of the value of collateral pledged against bank loans. Feeling secured, banks lose incentives to monitor borrowing firms. Thus, wealth effect of bailout from political connection is partially offset by the losses of valuable information brought about by bank lending. In equilibrium, the trade-off from gains out of political connections and costs due to losses from information-based bank monitoring depend on (i) the country’s disclosure laws, (ii) the political environment, (iii) the premium paid to form connections, and (iv) the state of the economy

How a regulatory capital requirement affects banks' productivity: an application to emerging economies

© 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York. This paper presents a novel approach to measure efficiency and productivity decomposition in the banking systems of emerging economies with a special focus on the role of equity capital. We model the requirement to hold levels of a fixed input, i.e. equity, above the long run equilibrium level or, alternatively, to achieve a target equity-asset ratio. To capture the effect of this under-leveraging, we allow the banking system to operate in an uneconomic region of the technology. Productivity decomposition is developed to include exogenous factors such as policy constraints. We use a panel data set of banks in emerging economies during the financial upheaval period of 2005–2008 to analyse these ideas. Results indicate the importance of the capital constraint in the decomposition of productivity

Dividend policy of Indonesian listed firms: The role of families and the state

We investigate factors influencing the dividend policy of the listed Indonesian firms by focusing on agency costs and ownership structure. Our study finds that firms with higher conflicts of interest among managers and shareholders pay lower dividends. In the context of the conflicts of interest among major and minor shareholders, we find that such conflicts would exert little impact on dividend payments. Further, we find that the family-controlled firms prefer to pay less dividends whereas the corporations with higher state ownership are associated with larger dividend payments. Our findings are in line with the argument that the Indonesian state consider corporate dividends as one of the main sources of revenues other than corporate taxes in their government budget. This issue may have adverse effects on the growth of cash-constrained small and medium-sized enterprises

ESG complementarities in the US economy

This paper investigates ESG from the perspective of changes in input elasticities of substitution and complementarity. Rather than compute these elasticities from the cost function, we compute them from the Input Distance Function (IDF). Our data are from Refinitiv Eikon Datastream database. We focus on the US economy due to her global role in the world economy and hence spillover effects of uncertainties on the rest of the world. The data consist of 5,798 companies comprising 38 US industries that span for 12 years from 2009 to 2020 and include: (i) financial data on sales, capital and employees; (ii) two financial ratios and (iii) three main ESG indicators. We compute Antonelli Elasticity of Complementarity (AEC) and Allen-Uzawa Elasticity of Substitution (AES) from the translog of IDF function. We find that the standard inputs have positive AEC elasticities; however, ESG cross-elasticities exhibit negative signs, classifying them as q-substitutes. Therefore, an increase in one of the ESG values leads to a decrease in the marginal value of the other. On the other hand, AES elasticities have a negative sign only for the Governance-Environment “doublet'; the rest of the pairs are positive implying that they are p-complements

The cost efficiency of water utilities: when does public ownership matter?

This study explores the impact of different ownership types on the efficiency of water utilities. Theories and evidence have shown a puzzling relationship between ownership and performance. Moreover, relatively recent contributions (Andrews et al. 2011) have argued that this relationship can be further convoluted by the effect of organisational and environmental variables. The current study aims to contribute to this literature by providing some empirical evidence for Italy, by proposing a methodology that combines non-parametric efficiency estimation and cluster analysis. Our main findings indicate that privately owned utilities indirectly controlled by a public organisation reach the highest level of efficiency but, when size and geographical location enter the analysis, ownership has a stronger significant effect on efficiency, and mixed utilities gain higher cost efficiency. Therefore, we may conclude that administrative reforms about privatisation and the institutional setting should consider a set of variables that characterise each individual organisation

Islamic banks, deposit insurance reform, and market discipline: evidence from a natural framework

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are more subject to market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks